Matching Known Patients to Health Records in Washington State Data by Sweeney, Latanya
Sweeney                                                       Matching Known Patients to Health Records in Washington State Data 
 
dataprivacylab.org/projects/wa 1 v0.6 
Matching Known Patients to Health Records in Washington State Data 
 
Latanya Sweeney 
 
Harvard University 
latanya@fas.harvard.edu 
 
 
The State of Washington sells patient-level 
health data for $50. This publicly available 
dataset has virtually all hospitalizations 
occurring in the State in a given year, 
including patient demographics, diagnoses, 
procedures, attending physician, hospital, a 
summary of charges, and how the bill was 
paid. It does not contain patient names or 
addresses (only ZIPs). Newspaper stories 
printed in the State for the same year that 
contain the word "hospitalized” often 
include a patient’s name and residential 
information and explain why the person was 
hospitalized, such as vehicle accident or 
assault. News information uniquely and 
exactly matched medical records in the State 
database for 35 of the 81 cases (or 43 
percent) found in 2011, thereby putting 
names to patient records. A news reporter 
verified matches by contacting patients.  
Employers, financial organizations and 
others know the same kind of information as 
reported in news stories making it just as 
easy for them to identify the medical records 
of employees, debtors, and others. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine your personal health information 
flowing seamlessly between organizations 
and devices as needed. This liquidity in 
personal health information is to be the 
norm by 2015 according to the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA or the stimulus bill). ARRA 
provides financial compensation to 
healthcare providers and hospitals for using 
electronic health records [1, 2] so that 
patient measurements, diagnoses, 
procedures, medications, and demographics, 
along with physician notes and lab results 
will no longer be stored on paper but in 
digital format, enabling rapid and 
widespread sharing of patient data for many 
worthy purposes.  To facilitate data sharing, 
ARRA supports data exchanges through 
State and regional repositories and networks 
and establishes comprehensive databases. 
Several ARRA initiatives go online next 
year. A broad range of concerns about these 
initiatives has been raised previously (e.g., 
[3]). A critical question is patient protection. 
Are privacy safeguards sufficient to protect 
patients from harms?  
A concrete way to answer this 
question to test how well States currently 
protect patients when sharing health data 
widely beyond the care of the patient. 
Years earlier, most States passed 
legislation requiring information about each 
hospital visit to be reported to the State, and 
most of those States in turn, share a copy of 
the information widely for many purposes. 
Actually, anyone can usually get a public 
version of the data that includes patient 
demographics, clinical diagnoses and 
procedures, a list of attending physicians, a 
breakdown of charges, and how the bill was 
paid for each hospitalization in the State. 
The information does not contain patient 
names but often includes residential postal 
codes (ZIPs).  In comparison, data from 
ARRA initiatives will have these fields and 
many additional details, such as lab values 
and medical measurements, and will include 
office visits as well as hospitalizations. 
Often medical information is benign 
–a broken arm gets a cast –but other times a 
hospitalization can include surprising 
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results, such as drug or alcohol dependency 
appearing in an emergency hospitalization 
following a motor vehicle accident. So, care 
must be taken when sharing patient 
information. 
Statewide databases have been 
around for years and shared widely. If there 
was a problem, one might expect to be able 
to point to a litany of harms, but a lack of 
enforcement and a lack of transparency 
confound findings. The Washington Post 
reported that the federal government 
received nearly 20,000 allegations of 
privacy violations, but imposed no fines and 
prosecuted only two criminal cases by 2006 
[4]. As of this writing, I found no reported 
privacy violations from any State databases 
though it is unclear how and to whom one 
would report a violation. Most people are 
unaware of these statewide datasets, so even 
if harmed, it is unlikely a person would be 
able to link harms back to the shared data.  
On the other hand, there is anecdotal 
evidence.  In a 1996 survey of Fortune 500 
companies, a third of the 84 respondents 
said they used medical records about 
employees to make hiring, firing and 
promotional decisions [5]. There have been 
allusions to a banker crossing medical 
information with debtor information at his 
bank, and if a match results, tweaking 
creditworthiness accordingly [6]. True or 
not, it is certainly possible, and the lack of 
transparency in data sharing makes detection 
virtually impossible even though the harm 
can be egregious. What is needed is a 
concrete example of how patients can be 
identified in this kind of data. 
If you know someone who went to the 
hospital and you know the approximate 
reason and/or the person's basic age, 
gender, and ZIP code, can you find his 
medical record in a State database? 
At first glance, identifying patients 
to medical records may seem academic or a 
question of curiosity.  But if successful, 
employers might already be checking on 
employees’ health, financial institutions 
adjusting credit worthiness based on medical 
information, data mining companies 
constructing personal medical dossiers from 
pharmacy records, and people snooping on 
friends, family and neighbors.  Any of these 
parties could know when a person may have 
gone to the hospital and other relevant 
information needed to find that person’s 
medical record.   
BACKGROUND 
 
The Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act (the first) in the United 
States is the federal regulation that dictates 
sharing of medical information beyond the 
immediate care of the patient, prescribing to 
whom and how physicians, hospitals, and 
insurers may share a patient’s medical 
information broadly. State data collections 
are exempt from HIPAA. A State may share 
data mandated by State legislation in any 
form it deems appropriate. How do State 
decisions compare to HIPAA? 
The Safe Harbor provision of the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule prescribes a way to 
share medical data publicly. Dates only 
report the year, and ZIP codes are the first 3 
digits, if the population in those ZIP codes is 
greater than 20,000 and ‘00000’ otherwise. 
No explicit identifiers, such as name, Social 
Security numbers, or addresses can appear.1  
In comparison, many States share 
health information with less than a year 
specification on admissions and discharges 
and in some cases, providing the month and 
year of birth, not just the year [7].  Other 
states generalize values beyond the HIPAA 
standard, typically providing age ranges 
and/or ranges of ZIP codes. What guidelines 
should ARRA initiatives follow?  The 
answer is not clear without specific 
examples of whether patients can be 
matched by name to the records.  
                                                            
1 45 CFR 164.514(b)(2) (2002). 
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Re-identifications of health data involve 
uniquely and specifically matching a named 
person to his medical record, and re-
identifications have been done previously. 
In 1997, I showed how demographics 
appearing in medical data that did not have 
the names of patients could be linked to 
registries of people (e.g., voter lists) to 
restore name and contact information to the 
medical data [8]. My earliest example was 
identifying the medical information of 
William Weld, former governor of 
Massachusetts, using only his date of birth, 
gender, and 5-digit ZIP code appearing in 
medical data and a voter list [9]. I also used 
populations reported in the U.S. Census to 
predict that at most 87 percent of the U.S. 
population had unique combinations of date 
of birth, gender, and 5-digit ZIP [8].  
Recently, others have challenged 
whether there really is any vulnerability to 
being re-identified by these fields, citing a 
lack of documented examples and of 
verified results (e.g. [10]). To address these 
concerns, new experiments are underway. 
Last month, a significant number of names 
and contact information were verified as 
being correctly matched to publicly 
available profiles in the Personal Genome 
Project using date of birth, gender and 5-
digit ZIP [11]. Of course today, unlike the 
era of the Weld re-identification, State 
databases do not share full dates of birth, 
begging the question be investigated further. 
Can patients be re-identified in today’s State 
health data? 
 
MATERIALS 
Materials are: a collection of old news 
stories; an online public records service for 
locating basic demographics on Americans; 
and, a State database of hospitalizations in 
the same year and state as the news stories. 
More information about each resource 
appears below followed by descriptions of 
preliminary processing of diagnosis and 
hospital codes and admissions dates. 
 
News Stories 
Searching the LexisNexis newspaper 
archive [12] for news stories printed in 2011 
in Washington State newspapers that contain 
the word “hospitalization” and that refer to a 
hospitalization of a person in 2011 yielded 
66 distinct news stories from four news 
sources: Spokesman Review (28 stories), 
The Associated Press and Local Wire (17 
stories), The Columbian (19 stories), and 
Mukilteo Beacon (2 stories). Table 1 has a 
summary. 
Figure 1 provides an example news 
story about a motorcycle crash in which 61-
year-old Raymond Boylston, from Soap 
Lake, Washington, is sent to Lincoln 
Hospital. 
The news stories referenced a total 
of 111 people. Some stories described 
incidents involving multiple people.  Not all 
stories contained a name of a person; only 
86 names appeared in the news stories.  One 
story did not have the names of the people, 
but did have an explicit street address in 
which 4 people who lived there were 
hospitalized following a house fire. So, the 
total number of subjects is 90, which is the 
86 named people and the 4 people residing 
at the known street address. 
Most news stories that listed names 
were of motor vehicle crashes (51 stories) 
and assaults (12 stories).  Some stories 
reported medical hospitalizations (13 
stories), primarily of popular people (e.g., a 
professional soccer player, a judge, and a 
Congressman). The remaining 14 stories 
reported shootings, suicide attempts, house 
fires, and other events. Table 2 lists types of 
stories for the 90 subjects. 
News stories tend to report the 
person’s name, age, residential information, 
type of incident, incident date, and hospital.  
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Table 1. Distribution of news stories by news 
source for a total number of 66 stories. 
 
 MAN,	  61,	  THROWN	  FROM	  MOTORCYCLE	  A	   61-­‐year-­‐old	   Soap	   Lake	   man	   was	   hospitalized	  Saturday	  afternoon	  after	  he	  was	   thrown	   from	  his	  motorcycle.	   	   Raymond	   Boylston	   was	   riding	   his	  2003	   Harley-­‐Davidson	   north	   on	   Highway	   25,	  when	  he	  failed	  to	  negotiate	  a	  curve	  to	  the	  left.	  His	  motorcycle	   became	   airborne	   before	   landing	   in	   a	  wooded	  area.	  Boylston	  was	  thrown	  from	  the	  bike;	  he	   was	   wearing	   a	   helmet	   during	   the	   12:24	   p.m.	  incident.	  	  He	  was	  taken	  to	  Lincoln	  Hospital.	  	  	  [Spokesman	  Review	  10/23/2011] 
 
Figure 1. Sample extract of a news story that 
contains name, age, residential information, 
hospital, incident date, and type of incident.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of news stories by type of 
incident for 90 subjects.  
 
 
Harvesting these values, as available, from 
the news stories and adding the news source 
and publication date comprise the 
“NewsData” dataset used in this study,  
which starts with 90 records, one for each 
subject. Figure 2 reports the distribution of 
fields in NewsData. Gender is present in all 
the records. Seventeen records have all the 
fields and 31 records have six of the fields. 
Only one record has just name, gender and 
address with no hospital or medical content. 
 
Online Public Records 
 
Numerous online services offer search 
facilities for government-collected 
information (or public records) in the United 
States about a person. When a person’s 
name and/or other demographics are 
entered, these services may return the 
person’s date of birth, history of residential 
addresses, phone numbers, criminal history, 
and professional and business licenses, 
though specifics vary among states and 
services. Prices and results vary too. Some 
are free online, but most services offer a per 
lookup fee (e.g., $3 to $10 per lookup). 
Some services offer monthly or yearly 
subscription plans, which can significantly 
lower per-lookup costs (e.g., $0.75 per 
lookup for up to 300 searches, or unlimited 
searches for $40/year). In this study, 
references to these kinds of search results 
are called “PublicRecords”. 
 
Hospital Data 
 
The “Comprehensive Hospital Abstract 
Reporting System: Hospital Inpatient 
Dataset: Clinical Data” [13] lists 
hospitalizations in Washington State for the 
Year 2011 and costs $50. This data contains 
a record for each hospitalization in the State 
and the total number of hospitalizations (or 
records) is 648,384. Each hospitalization is 
described using 88 fields of data; these 
include: patient’s 5-digit ZIP code, age in 
years and months, race, ethnicity, and 
gender; hospital; month of discharge; 
number of days in the hospital; admission 
type, source and weekend indicator; 
discharge status; how the bill was paid; 
diagnosis codes; procedure codes; and list of 
attending physicians. This dataset is termed 
“HospitalData” in this study.  
For computer storage efficiency, 
most fields contain codes rather than 
English descriptions, so Washington State 
provides a dictionary that defines each code.  
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Figure 2. Distribution 
of values for fields 
harvested from news 
stories. Name is 
present in 86 cases 
with 4 others having 
an explicit street 
address, for a total of 
90 subjects.  “General 
Address” refers to 
generalized residential 
information, such as 
town, city, county or 
region of the state.  
“Type” and “Details” 
refer to the kind of 
incident and any 
medical details. 
 
Figure 3 provides an example of part of a 
record in HospitalData, showing the code 
and its definition where appropriate. It 
describes an emergency admission (Admit 
Type field) of a 60-year-old, 725-months-
old (Age fields) white, non-Hispanic 
(Race/Ethnicity) male (Gender). The total 
charge of $71,708 and was paid by a 
combination of three payers. The emergency 
is from a motorcycle accident (Emergency 
Codes) and the diagnoses include a fracture 
of his pelvis (Diagnosis Codes). 
 
Diagnosis Codes to NewsData 
 
In a preliminary step, adding diagnosis 
fields to NewsData makes it more 
compatible for matching to HospitalData.  
Using the type of incident described in a 
news story, we can list diagnosis codes that 
would likely appear among the diagnosis 
codes in HospitalData. The International 
Classification of Diseases 9th edition (or 
ICD9 codes) defines more than 15,000 
diagnosis codes [14], grouped into three 
categories: all numeric codes describe 
medical diseases (e.g., diseases of the 
digestive system or complications of 
pregnancy); codes beginning with an ‘E’ 
describe external causes of injury or 
poisoning (e.g., motor vehicle accidents or 
assaults), and codes beginning with a “V” 
describe factors that may influence health 
status (e.g., communicable diseases, drug 
dependency, or tobacco use). 
An ICD9 diagnosis code is an 
alphanumeric string where the leftmost 
characters represent a family of values, 
made more specific by adding more 
characters to the right. Figure 4 shows an 
example using emergency codes that begin 
with E81, which are some motor vehicle 
accident codes.  A code of E816 describes 
an accident involving an out of control 
motor vehicle that had no collision. Adding 
another digit provides more detail about 
how the patient was involved or injured. For 
example, E8162 describes the case where 
the vehicle was a motorcycle and the 
motorcyclist was injured. 
More than half of the news stories 
involved motor vehicle accidents and a 
substantial number of stories described 
assaults (see Table 2).  The ICD9 codes for 
motor vehicle accidents begin with the 
codes E81 and E82.  Assaults begin with 
E96.  Table 3 reports the numbers of records 
containing these codes in HospitalData: 
5232 motor vehicle accidents and 1612 
assaults. 
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Hospital 162: Sacred Heart 
Medical Center in 
Providence 
Admit Type 1: Emergency 
Type of Stay 1: Inpatient 
Length of Stay 6 days 
Discharge Date Oct-2011 
Discharge 
Status 
6: Dsch/Trfn to home 
under the care of an 
health service 
organization 
Charges  $71708.47 
Payers 1: Medicare 
 6: Commercial insurance 
 625: Other government 
sponsored patients 
Emergency 
Codes 
E8162: motor vehicle 
traffic accident due to 
loss of control; loss 
control mv-mocycl 
Diagnosis 
Codes  
80843: closed fracture 
of other specified part 
of pelvis 
 51851: pulmonary 
insufficiency following 
trauma & surgery 
 86500: injury to spleen 
without mention of open 
wound into cavity 
 80705: closed fracture 
of rib(s); fracture 
five ribs-close 
 5849: acute renal 
failure; unspecified 
 8052: closed fracture 
of dorsal [thoracic] 
vertebra without 
mention of spinal cord 
injury 
 2761: hyposmolality 
&/or hyponatremia 
 78057: tachycardia 
 2851: acute 
posthemorrhagic anemia 
Age in Years 60 
Age in Months 725 
Gender Male 
ZIP 98851 
State Reside WA 
Race/Ethnicity White, Non-Hispanic 
Procedure 
Codes 
5781: Suture bladder 
laceration 
 7939: 7919: Open/Closed 
reduction of fracture 
of other specified bone 
Physicians … 
… … 
 
Figure 3. Sample extract of fields of information 
from a hospitalization record in HospitalData.   
 
 
Figure 4. Excerpt of ICD9 Diagnosis coding tree. 
As more digits get appended to the right, the 
details get more specific.  
 
 
Table 3. Number of health records having a 
diagnosis starting with E81 or E82 for motor 
vehicle accidents and E96 for assaults from a total 
of 648,384 hospitalizations in HospitalData. 
 
 
To facilitate simple matching of NewsData 
to HospitalData, I added diagnosis fields to 
NewsData and populated the fields with 
general versions of ICD9 codes (the leftmost 
digits) whose descriptions matched the 
incident details harvested from the news 
stories (see Details in Figure 2).   In the 51 
cases involving motor vehicle accidents, I 
merely recorded “E81” and “E82”.  In the 
12 assault cases, I recorded “E96”.  In the 
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remaining 27 cases, I used automated search 
for ICD9 codes whose descriptions matched 
details harvested from news stories.  I 
recorded the most general version of the 
ICD9 code that matched the description –
i.e., the three leftmost characters only.  
For example, one news story 
reported Congressman Hastings was 
hospitalized with “diverticulitis”. A search 
of this term yielded ICD9 code “56211”, so 
the code “562” was added to his record in 
NewsData.  
As shown in Figure 2, all but two of 
the 90 records in NewsData had content in 
the incident Type or Details field. I matched 
news descriptions to ICD9 codes in 72 of 
the 90 cases (or 80 percent of the stories) in 
NewsData. The specific diagnosis codes 
were: 437, 444, 508, 518, 562, 569, 800, 
801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 808, 818, 824, 827, 
829, 861, 864, 873, 884, 900, 910, 920, 923, 
942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 959, V58, 
E81, E82, E88, E89, E92, E95, E96, E97, 
and E98. 
 
Hospital Codes to NewsData 
 
Many of the news stories included the name 
of the hospital (50 of 90 or 56 percent, as 
listed in Figure 2).  One news story merely 
stated a “Tri-Cities hospital” which is one in 
a group of about a dozen possible hospitals. 
As described earlier, HospitalData uses 
codes instead of English text in many fields, 
and one such field is hospital.  An example 
appears in Figure 3. The code for Sacred 
Heart Medical Center in Providence is 162. 
Lincoln Hospital has a code of 137. 
A dictionary of hospitals was 
included with HospitalData that lists 183 
hospitals in Washington State along with 
their assigned codes.  Some hospitals appear 
multiple times, with a letter added to the 
code to distinguish different units (e.g., 
rehabilitation or acute care).  
The name of each hospital appearing 
in a news story was automatically looked up 
in the dictionary of Washington State 
hospitals and a new field added and 
populated that had the code for the Hospital.  
Nine of the hospitalization reports in 
the news stories were in other states, 
specifically Oregon and Idaho, and as a 
result, those hospitalizations would not be in 
HospitalData.  Therefore, these records were 
removed from NewsData, lowering the 
number of actual subjects to 81.  The total 
number of subjects in the remainder of this 
writing will be 81 unless otherwise stated.  
Other than those news stories 
referencing out-of-state hospitals and the 
one news story that referenced a Tri-City 
hospital, all other hospitals present in the 
news story were uniquely matched and 
appended to NewsData.  
 
Admission Dates to HospitalData 
 
HospitalData includes the month and year of 
the discharge and the length of stay in days 
but has no field for the admission date.  On 
the other hand, a new story reports when an 
incident occurred.  The date of the incident 
in the new story corresponds to the hospital 
admission date. So, I use the month of the 
discharge and the number of days in the 
hospital to compute a one-month range for 
the admission. 
The earliest possible day of the 
admission would be the first day of the 
month of the discharge less the number of 
days in the hospital (“admit begin”).  The 
latest possible day of the admission would 
be the last day of the month of the discharge 
less the number of days in the hospital 
(“admit end”). The date of the incident 
reported in the news story must be on or 
after admit begin but before or on admit end 
for the news story to match that record of 
HospitalData.  
For example, the news story in 
Figure 1 has an incident date of October 18, 
2011.  The medical record in Figure 3 
reports a discharge month of October 2011 
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and a 6-day stay.  The earliest the admission 
could have occurred was September 25, 
2011 (admit begin) and the latest was 
October 25, 2011 (admit end). So, the news 
story incident date matches the possible 
admission date for the medical record. 
 
I have now extended NewsData to include 
diagnosis codes and hospital codes based on 
information appearing in the news stories, 
and reduced the number of records in 
NewsData from 90 to 81 by discarding news 
reports about out of state hospitalizations.  I 
have also extended HospitalData to include 
two fields, admitbegin and admitend, that 
describe a one month window in which the 
admission must have occurred.  Armed with 
these enhancements, we are ready to match 
NewsData with HospitalData. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Acquire 5-digit ZIP codes from public 
records using {name, residence information, age} 
from the news story. Age in years is from news 
and date of birth from public records. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The automated approach matches news 
information and ZIP (from public records) to 
hospital data on a combination of {gender, age, 
hospital, admit month, diagnoses related to 
incidence, ZIP}, thereby putting a name to a 
medical record. Age is in years and months and 
the month of birth comes from public records. 
APPROACH 
As described earlier, a news story containing 
the word “hospitalization” often includes 
some combination of name, age, residence, 
gender, hospital, and incident specifics 
sufficient to infer admission month and 
some of the diagnoses.  An initial step is to 
look up the person’s name, age and 
residence information in PublicRecords to 
learn the person’s date of birth and any 5-
digit ZIP codes associated with the person. 
(This step can be automated with the 
purchase of a public records database.)  
Figure 5 provides a depiction of this initial 
step. Afterwards, two different approaches 
were investigated, one involved automated 
matching of fields and the other uses human 
exploration. 
 
Automated Approach 
 
A direct computer comparison is made 
between the newly learned ZIP and age in 
months (derived from birthdate and incident 
date) and other information from the news 
article –i.e., gender, age, hospital, admission 
month, and some likely diagnoses– to the 
fields of information in each record in 
HospitalData. Any blank fields in NewsData 
are not used for comparison. When the 
overall comparison uniquely matches on 
each field of information provided, and the 
match of a news story is to one and only one 
record in HealthData, the result associates 
the name and residence information from 
the news story to the person’s health data, 
even though the health data did not 
previously include the name of the patient. 
If the comparison relates a news story to 
more than one record in HealthData, the 
comparison does not yield a match in this 
study.  Only exact and unique matches are 
accepted. If no match is found, the approach 
repeats suppressing one or two values in the 
NewsData to see if one and only matching 
record appears in HealthData. 
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For example, the news story in Figure 1 
contains {Raymond Boylston, 60 year old, 
male, from Soap Lake, admitted to Lincoln 
Hospital, in October 2011, for a motorcycle-
related accident}. If a search of 
HospitalData yields a unique match on these 
fields, then I consider the result a match of 
the news story to the hospital record.  If no 
match is found, one field in the news story is 
dropped and tested, and the test repeats 
dropping each field in turn. If no records 
uniquely match when any one field is 
dropped, then two fields are dropped and 
each possibility tested.  Figure 2 shows a 
uniquely matching health record when age 
and hospital are dropped.  
 
Human Approach 
 
A temporary employee, who was 
resourceful and knowledgeable about how to 
use the Internet and computers but who had 
no degree or training in computer science, 
mathematics, statistics or medicine, was 
hired through an employment agency as a 
“human investigator”.  I did not know her 
previously. After reviewing some of the 
matched and unmatched cases resulting 
from the automated approach, I asked the 
temp to see if she could find matching 
records for some of the new stories missed 
by the automated approach –i.e., cases 
where using all the fields in the news story 
led to no match. She could only use a set of 
candidate medical records, the news story, 
and any information she found publicly and 
freely available on the Internet. 
 
Scoring 
 
A news reporter agreed to score results by 
interviewing those matched to confirm the 
contents of the health record with the 
person. (No medical information or personal 
identity would be publicly revealed unless 
the person explicitly agreed to share his 
identity or medical information publicly.) 
 
RESULTS 
 
Directly matching the fields of the records in 
NewsData to those in HealthData yielded 
unique and exact matches on 35 of the 81 
records in NewsData (or 43 percent). Ten of 
the records in NewsData matched two 
records in HospitalData ambiguously, 
eleven matched three or more records in 
HealthData, and 25 matched none. The 
matches were systematically reviewed for 
consistency with details in the news story 
and other online information and no 
inconsistencies were found. 
 Of the 35 exact and unique matches, 
30 matches used all the values supplied in 
the news story, 5 matches resulted when one 
value from the news story was dropped 
(ZIP, age, or hospital) and 1 match resulted 
when two values were dropped (age and 
hospital). In one case, the name that 
appeared in the news story was not found, 
but a public records search without the last 
name matched one person exactly and that 
name with her associated ZIP and age was 
used.  
 The scientific accuracy of these 
results rests in the accuracy of the 
newspaper, health and public records 
information.  Hospitals in the State must 
provide the information to the State by law, 
and the fields are drawn directly from billing 
records. HealthData reportedly contains all 
hospitalizations in the State [13]. Most of 
the news articles are from police reports; 
one was from a press release of the 
hospitalization of a Congressman and a few 
seemed to be regular news stories.  There is 
no guarantee that these data are error free, 
but any errors made in matching must result 
from errors in the data sources and not in the 
matching.   
The automated approach uses an 
exact match, not a probabilistic one. 
Probabilistic matching would likely increase 
the number of matches, but my interest is to 
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get as accurate a match as the data allows, 
not as many matches as likely.  
 The news reporter was given the 35 
matched results, from which he chose 15 to 
pursue by phone.  He contacted 8, and 
confirmed all 8 were correctly matched 
(100% correct). He attempted to contact 6 
others, but was not able to make phone 
contact with them during the 7-day 
evaluation period. Details from his 
interviews with those who agreed to public 
disclosure appear in his associated news 
story [15]. 
The human investigator was given 
two cases of high-profile people, a soccer 
player and a Congressman, one case for 
which the news story was unusual (a sky-
diving accident), and two other cases. No 
match was found using automated 
comparison for these cases without dropping 
one or two values.  The human investigator 
had two workdays in which to investigate 
these five cases.  
She compiled portfolios on each 
case, documenting not only which record in 
the HealthData was correct, but also why the 
exact automated comparison failed to match.  
She was successful in all 5 cases. 
In the two cases of high profile 
people, the ZIP code was not of a personal 
residence but the soccer franchise in the case 
of the soccer player, and his campaign 
headquarters in case of the Congressman.  
When these ZIP codes were used, the 
modified news information uniquely and 
exactly matched the same health records the 
human investigator found. 
The news story of the sky diving 
accident found in LexisNexis had very few 
details.  When she looked online at other 
news stories, she found his age and the fact 
that he lived in another state. Because he 
had an out of state ZIP code, she was able to 
quickly identify his record.  When his 
personal information was appended to the 
news record, the automated comparison 
uniquely matched the same hospital record.  
 Similarly, her success in the other 
two cases resulted from augmenting the 
original news story with additional or 
correcting information she found online.  
 
Most of the health records seemed to just 
report specifics one would expect to find 
related to the reported incident.  But about 
one-third of the health records that were 
automatically matched to news stories (10 of 
35 records) included references to venereal 
diseases, drug dependency, alcohol use, 
tobacco use, and other diagnoses or payment 
issues that may be sensitive, even though 
most of these records were for motor vehicle 
accidents. 
  
DISCUSSION 
 
This experiment demonstrates how medical 
information for a targeted individual can be 
obtained using automated or human means, 
and neither takes sophisticated expertise. As 
one would expect, automated matching 
gives more results quickly than the human 
approach, but the human investigator 
located and used other sources specific to 
the record. 
 There are many more newspaper 
sources available in the State.  This study 
only used those available through one 
service, but other news services offer other 
sources, and most newspapers have their 
own online websites.  Overall, this means 
the number of possible cases drawn from 
news could be substantially larger. 
Even though this study used 
newspapers as source information about a 
patient’s identity, an employer could use 
hospital leave information to check on 
employees, a financial institution could use 
credit account information to assessing 
credit worthiness of clients who report 
medical illness as a reason for delayed 
payments, and a person snooping on friends 
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or family could merely inquire about when, 
where and why the person was hospitalized.  
Even a data mining company could use 
prescription information to locate health 
records using the name, date of birth, 
address about the person, and the medicine 
and dosage to infer diagnosis codes. 
This experiment is important 
because it demonstrates how health data, 
which is currently shared publicly and 
widely without the knowledge of the patient, 
could be putting patients at risk. This is a 
timely consideration as America gets ready 
to unleash health information exchanges, 
which will share much more health 
information on each patient and the data 
sharing will be far less transparent.  
 
What Can Be Done 
 
The goal is not to stop data sharing.  On the 
contrary, sharing data beyond the patient 
encounter offers many worthy benefits to 
society.  These data may be particularly 
useful because they contain a complete set 
of hospital discharges within the state, 
thereby allowing comparisons across 
regions and states such as rating hospital and 
physician performances and assessing 
variations and trends in care, access, charges 
and outcomes. Research studies that have 
used these datasets include: examinations of 
utilization differences based on proximity 
[16], patient safety [17, 18], and procedures 
[19]; and, a comparison of motorcycle 
accident results in states with and without 
helmet laws [20]. The very completeness 
that helps these studies makes it impossible 
to rely on patients to consent to sharing 
because the resulting data would not be as 
complete.  
The goal is not to stop data sharing 
but to be smarter about how data sharing is 
done. This is a particularly important as the 
top buyers of statewide databases are not 
researchers, but private companies, 
especially those constructing data profiles 
on individuals [21]. 
Washington State could choose to 
share its data in a form that adheres to the 
standards set by the HIPAA Safe Harbor –
reporting dates in years and geography in 3-
digit ZIP codes (and blank if the ZIP has a 
small population). In patient demographic 
fields, Washington's data has 5-digit ZIP 
codes and age, appearing more protective 
than HIPAA, because an age is a 2-year 
range. However, Washington also shares the 
month and year of discharge and the number 
of days hospitalized, allowing inference of a 
month range for the admission date. Also, 
Washington's data has a field that gives the 
age of the patient in months, which when 
reversed, gives year and a 2-month window 
for the birth month. These extra inferences, 
5-digit ZIP code, admission month and bi-
monthly birth year, are more specific than 
just year, and were useful in matching.   
To be equivalent to HIPAA, 
Washington State could drop the discharge 
month and reporting no more than the year 
of birth of the patient. Of course, these 
redactions may cause the resulting data to be 
less useful for some purposes, so for those 
uses, Washington State may have additional 
requirements for someone to meet in order 
to acquire the more sensitive data.   
Better options promise to come from 
technology.  The same technology that has 
brought us today's data rich networked 
society is the same technology that can 
provide the best privacy protection.  To get 
there, however, we have to align policy and 
technology incentives, and that too is where 
this experiment fits in.   
Policy should use best practices, 
which improve over time as privacy 
technology and the science of data privacy 
advances. Society can benefit from cycles of 
published re-identifications, because doing 
so will rapidly lead to improved techno-
policy protections.  It is an evolutionary 
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cycle. First, a re-identification vulnerability 
becomes known, which leads to improved 
practices and technical solutions, which in 
turn, leads to more re-identifications, and so 
on, until eventually we achieve robust 
technical solutions.  
The cyclic approach of expose-then-
improve is how strong encryption 
developed.  Today, we use strong encryption 
for all sorts of tasks, such as online banking 
and purchasing.  But the earliest forms of 
encryption were just ad hoc decisions, 
similar to the kind of ad hoc decisions made 
about data sharing today. Then, someone 
would publish a way to break the leading 
scheme of the time, spawning others to 
develop better methods, which in turn, 
would be broken, until eventually, we got 
the strong encryption society enjoys 
today.  That's the same kind of cycle we 
need for data privacy so that society can 
enjoy widespread data sharing with privacy 
protections and not be forced to falsely 
choose between privacy or the benefits of 
data sharing. 
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